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To what extent are citizens able to distinguish between fulfilled and unfulfilled 
election pledges? What explains variation in the extent to which citizens are able to 
do so accurately? The answers to these questions are central to the idea of promissory 
representation (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 515), which is found in the responsible party 
model and the mandate theory of democracy (Downs, 1957; Klingemann, Hofferbert 
and Budge, 1994; Grossback, Peterson and Stimson, 2005; McDonald and Budge, 
2005). Promissory representation holds that parties make commitments during 
election campaigns and attempt to follow through on those commitments if they enter 
government after elections. Citizens’ capacity to respond accurately to policy 
performance is as vital as parties’ behaviour to ensuring a strong democratic chain of 
command and control. Without such a capacity on the part of citizens, the responsible 
party model would fail. For VO Key (1966), the responsible electorate, which rewards 
and punishes parties according to those parties’ performance in government, is the 
counterpart to responsible parties. If voters are to respond in this way, they must be 
able to distinguish accurately between promises that were kept and those that were 
broken.  
 Existing research on election pledges mainly describes and explains variation 
in actual fulfilment, rather than citizens’ evaluations of fulfilment. The findings 
suggest a puzzle that we address. Generally speaking, well above 50 percent of 
pledges are fulfilled at least partially, and for some single-party governments the 
figure is above 80 percent (Pomper and Lederman, 1980; Rallings, 1987; Royed 
1996; Thomson et al., 2017). However, in most countries the majority of citizens 
believe that parties break their promises. In the single-party governments that are 
typical of the United Kingdom, researchers typically find that above 70 percent of 
election pledges are fulfilled (Rallings, 1987; Royed, 1996). By contrast, only a 
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minority of UK respondents agree with the statement “People we elect as MPs try to 
keep the promises they have made during the election” (ISSP, 2008).
1
  
 Few studies have addressed this puzzle to date. Through in-depth interviews 
with Swedish citizens, Naurin (2011) found that citizens’ generally hold a broad and 
amorphous understanding of pledges. By contrast, published research on pledge 
fulfilment is based on clear definitions of election pledges that distinguish these 
statements from campaign rhetoric. Thomson’s (2011) study of citizens’ evaluations 
of pledge fulfilment in Ireland and Naurin and Oscarsson’s (2017) study of Sweden 
incorporated this insight. Rather than ask citizens general questions about the 
fulfilment of pledges, which allow respondents to define pledges as they will, they 
asked citizens to assess the fulfilment of specific pledges that had been made in a 
previous election campaign. The headline findings were that citizens are able to 
distinguish between pledges that were in fact fulfilled or unfulfilled, and that their 
evaluations are also shaped by a range of individual-level characteristics. Given the 
scarcity of research on this important topic for representative democracy, the new data 
we present on British citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment are welcome. 
We examine whether citizens’ trust in governing parties affects their 
evaluations of the extent to which parties keep their promises. Following Lenard’s 
(2008) distinction between the concepts of mistrust and distrust, we argue that distinct 
                                                        
1
 Other approaches have been used to examine the link between campaign statements 
and subsequent government policies. These include comparisons of the general 
direction of campaign commitments and subsequent policies (e.g. Stokes, 2001), and 
of thematic emphases in election programs and subsequent public spending priorities 
(e.g. Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge, 1994). The overall conclusion is that elected 
representatives generally follow through on their commitments. 
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aspects of trust refer firstly to a knowledge-based and vigilant responsiveness to 
actual government performance and, secondly, to a heuristic based on a general 
expectation about performance, which is at most weakly related to actual 
performance. Lenard (2008) defines mistrust as a healthy vigilance, which implies 
that mistrustful citizens are well informed and able to identify fulfilled pledges as 
fulfilled and unfulfilled pledges as unfulfilled. Following this line of reasoning, we 
examine and find evidence of an interaction between actual pledge fulfilment, 
citizens’ knowledge about politics, and citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment. 
Actual performance, in terms of whether parties actually fulfilled their pledges, has 
the strongest effect on the evaluations of the most knowledgeable citizens, although it 
also impacts on the evaluations of the less knowledgeable. 
Distrust, by contrast, equates with cynicism and the expectation of betrayal 
and disappointment. Distrust is a negative heuristic that people use to inform their 
evaluations, which accords with recent research that treats trust as a heuristic 
(Hetherington, 2004; Rudolph and Evans, 2005). We use a survey experiment in the 
2014-17 British Election Study, which alters the salience of heuristic thinking based 
on citizens’ pre-existing levels of distrust (BES; Fieldhouse, Green, Evans, Schmitt 
and Van der Eijk, 2015). When the salience of distrust-based heuristic thinking is 
raised (lowered), respondents’ pre-existing levels of distrust have a stronger (weaker) 
effect on their evaluations of pledge fulfilment. We discuss how our research design 
and findings shed light on the intricate ways in which distinct aspects of trust impact 
on citizens’ evaluations. 
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Two aspects of trust: The effects of healthy vigilance and heuristic thinking on 
citizens’ evaluations 
 
The dependent variable is citizens’ evaluations of the fulfilment of specific election 
pledges. If citizens have a healthy mistrust of governing parties, which makes them 
attentive to government performance when forming their assessments, then whether 
or not the pledge was in fact fulfilled will be one of the most important factors 
shaping their evaluations. Lenard (2008) argues that one component of trust, or rather 
the lack of trust, is mistrust, which implies a healthy vigilance on the part of citizens 
regarding the use and abuse of power by leaders. This idea is also found in the 
argument that democracy thrives best when citizens are not overly trusting of their 
leaders (see Maloy, 2009, for a review). This compels leaders to behave appropriately 
and enables citizens to detect poor performance when it occurs. 
 Actual policy performance in our study refers to whether or not the election 
pledge was in fact fulfilled. Pledges are campaign statements that are specific enough 
for people to make reasonably objective assessments of pledge fulfilment. For 
example, one of the pledges we examine is a statement in the 2010 Liberal 
Democrats’ manifesto to raise the tax-free allowance on income to £10,000 in the 
2011 tax year. The tax-free allowance was indeed raised to £10,000 within the 
governing period following the 2010 election, although not yet in 2011, as stated in 
the pledge, making it a partially fulfilled pledge. 
 Citizens’ information resources are relevant to their evaluations of pledge 
fulfilment, and in particular to the extent to which their evaluations are affected by 
actual performance. People who are more knowledgeable about politics hold a greater 
amount and higher quality of factual information about politics and are better able to 
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identify the relevance of new information. They are able to identify the relevance of 
current policy developments to parties’ previous pledges. This implies that citizens 
with greater political knowledge make more accurate evaluations of pledge fulfilment. 
Similarly, Zaller’s (1992) model of opinion formation posits that citizens with greater 
political awareness are more inclined to absorb new information about politics and 
policies. 
 Existing research on citizens’ information resources arrives at different 
conclusions regarding their ability to incorporate relevant facts about policies into 
their evaluations, and therefore their ability to play the role of a vigilant citizenry 
effectively. Some studies find that people are generally unaware of the most basic 
facts about their political systems and representatives (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996; Milner, 2001; Althaus, 2003). This suggests we should not expect actual pledge 
fulfilment to affect citizens’ evaluations. Other studies find that while citizens forget 
much detailed information, they have the cognitive capacities to make informed 
judgments (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Dalton, 1988; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau, 1995). 
Furthermore, studies based on macro models of public opinion often conclude that 
aggregate differences in public opinion are associated with meaningful differences in 
public mood and relevant policies (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Stimson, MacKuen and 
Erikson, 1995; Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson, 2001). At the aggregate level, public 
opinion is more responsive to actual performance than individuals’ lack of knowledge 
suggests. 
 Lenard (2008) defines as second aspect of trust in terms of distrust, which is 
distinct from “mistrust”. Distrust equates with cynicism and the expectation of 
betrayal and disappointment. Distrustful citizens generally do not expect parties to 
perform well in government. Citizens who are distrustful of governing parties are 
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likely to say that pledges are unfulfilled, regardless of what governments actually did. 
Likewise, according to this definition, trustful citizens are likely to say that pledges 
are fulfilled regardless of actual performance. This definition of trust understands the 
concept as a heuristic that people use to form their evaluations (Hetherington, 2004; 
Rudolph and Evans, 2005).  
 Distrust affects citizens’ evaluations through heuristic thinking, not through 
the absorption of information on actual performance. Distrustful citizens’ evaluations 
are affected by the common stereotype of promise-breaking politicians. By contrast, 
people with high levels of trust generally expect election pledges to be carried out, 
because such behaviour corresponds to their positive expectations of governing 
parties’ behaviour. One mechanism through which the trust heuristic affects citizens’ 
evaluations is that it provides a cue in the context of limited information. Even well-
informed citizens may lack the detailed information required to evaluate the 
fulfilment of specific election pledges. In the absence of factual information, trust or 
distrust in governing parties provides a guideline for making evaluations. Another 
mechanism concerns the inherent room for judgement in deciding whether or not a 
pledge is fulfilled. Although pledges are defined as statements that are specific 
enough for reliable evaluations of fulfilment to be made, some room for interpretation 
is inevitable. Again, the trust as distrust heuristic provides citizens with a means of 
making those interpretations. In the absence of complete and unambiguous 
information on pledge fulfilment, trusting citizens are more likely to evaluate 
promises as kept than are distrustful citizens.  
 Priming people to think about parties’ promises, as distinct from policy 
proposals in a more general sense, should raise the salience of heuristic thinking. 
When relying on heuristic thinking, distrustful citizens should evaluate pledges as 
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unfulfilled, while trusting citizens should evaluate pledges as fulfilled, regardless of 
actual performance. To test this, we vary the wording of questions posed to 
respondents. This follows the classic structure of priming experiments as pioneered 
by Sniderman and Piazza (1993), in which question wording is used to raise or lower 
the salience of a frame. The survey presents two groups of randomly selected 
respondents with different versions of similar questions. The first set of questions 
mentions “parties” and “promises”, and then goes on to give details of six specific 
election pledges. The second set of questions simply refers to “proposals” and then 
goes on to refer to the contents of the same six election pledges, but without stating 
that these proposals were in fact parties’ election pledges. We expect the “party-
promise” version of the questions to prime citizens to use heuristic thinking when 
making their evaluations. We therefore expect distrustful citizens who receive the 
“party promise” treatment to give more negative evaluations compared to both more 
trusting citizens who receive the same treatment and to other distrustful citizens who 
receive the alternative “proposal” treatment. Varying the question wording is not 
intended to alter respondents’ level of distrust. Rather, the question wording alters the 
salience of distrust as a heuristic for informing their evaluations.  
We focus on trust in governing parties, rather than government or politicians 
in general. Other researchers have defined the object of trust more broadly. For 
instance, according to Miller “[p]olitical trust can be thought of as a basic evaluative 
or affective orientation toward the government” (1974, p. 952; see also Rudolph and 
Popp, 2009, p. 335). Our narrower definition is appropriate given our interest in 
citizens’ evaluations of campaign commitments made by particular parties, rather than 
the government’s policy performance in general.  
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 Our main propositions concerning the effects of trust, defined in terms of 
mistrust and distrust, on citizens’ evaluations are as follows. 
Trust defined in terms of mistrust and healthy vigilance: Actual performance and 
political knowledge 
H1a: Citizens are more likely to say that a pledge was fulfilled if the pledge was 
actually fulfilled. 
H1b: The more knowledge citizens have about politics, the more their evaluations of 
pledge fulfilment are informed by whether or not the pledge was actually fulfilled. 
Trust defined in terms of distrust and heuristic thinking: Question wording and 
respondents’ self-repo ted trust in governing parties. 
H2a: Citizens are more likely to say that a pledge was fulfilled if they are presented 
with questions about the adoption of proposals rather than the keeping of promises 
by parties. 
H2b: The more citizens trust governing parties, the more likely they are to say that a 
pledge was fulfilled.  
H2c: This effect of citizens’ trust in governing parties on their evaluations is 
significantly greater when they are presented with questions about the keeping of 
promises by parties than with questions about the adoption of proposals. 
 While these propositions are our main theoretical interest, we recognise that 
other factors also matter, notably, party identification, personal circumstances and 
media attention. We control for these other explanations, but the available data do not 
support a detailed analysis of them all. Party identification is likely to affect citizens’ 
evaluations of pledge fulfilment, whether defined in terms of the traditional or 
revisionist views that frame many recent studies of the concept (e.g. Bartels et al., 
2011). According to the classical view, party identification is an affective bond 
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between voters and their preferred parties that it is formed in childhood, and functions 
as a perceptual screen through which voters view and interpret the political world 
(Campbell et al., 1960, p. 133). According to the revisionist view of party 
identification, voters’ party identification may change over time as a consequence of 
their evaluations of their parties’ policy performance (Fiorina, 1981). The observable 
implications of these two views for citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment are the 
same. Voters who identify with governing parties are more likely to give positive 
evaluations of those parties’ pledge fulfilment than non-identifiers, because this is 
most consistent with their existing identifications. Likewise, for voters who identify 
with opposition parties, their existing identifications are most consistent with negative 
evaluations of governing parties’ pledge fulfilment. The classical and revisionist 
views differ with respect to the consequences of citizens’ evaluations of policy 
performance on their future levels of party identification, a topic that is beyond the 
scope of our present study. Since our data are collected at one time point, we cannot 
discount the possibility that at least some of the party identification we observe is a 
consequence rather than a cause of citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment, as the 
revisionist view would suggest. We therefore include party identification as a control 
variable. 
 Respondents’ personal circumstances may be another set of explanatory 
variables (Funk and Garcia-Monet, 1997; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000, p. 638). 
To the extent that personal circumstances are relevant to the pledges we examine, 
these are associated with the demographic variables for which we control: occupation, 
education, age and gender. We include pledge controls for each of the pledges, since 
some of the pledges receives more media attention than others, which is likely to 
affect respondents’ evaluations.  
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Research design 
 
Our data concern citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment during the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition that governed from 2010 to 2015, which was the first 
coalition government to have held office in the UK since 1945. We expect the British 
public to give negative evaluations of pledge fulfilment in this context. Coalition 
governments are relatively rare in the UK and are generally viewed with scepticism.
2
 
Data from the British Election Study show that a majority of respondents thought that 
coalition government “makes it harder to decide who to blame”, is a “less efficient 
form of government than single party government”, and is less “in tune with public 
opinion than single party government”. Two thirds agreed with the statement that 
“parties cannot deliver on their promises when they govern in coalition” (Fieldhouse, 
Green, Evans, Schmitt and Van der Eijk, 2015).  
The data we examine come from the British Election Study, 2014-17 (ibid.), 
and refer to British citizens’ evaluations of the fulfilment of six specific election 
pledges that were made in the campaign prior to the 2010 British General Election. 
                                                        
2
 Ipsos-Mori has asked a question about whether repondents think it “will be a good 
thing or a bad thing for the country if no party achieves an overall majority” since 
1978, and only briefly in 1987 and again in 2010 did the number of those considering 
it a “bad thing” drop below 50 percent. Usually between 55 and 65 percent see it as a 
“bad thing”, while only a third or less think it might be a “good thing”. By 2014, the 
number thinking no party winning an overall majority in the next election would be a 
“good thing” had dropped to 26 percent, the lowest figure since 1983 (Ipsos-Mori, 
2011). 
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Citizens’ evaluations of the fulfilment of these pledges were measured in February-
March 2014 in the first wave of the British Election Study’s Internet Panel. We 
selected six election pledges from the 2010 election campaign to put to the public in 
2014 to obtain their evaluations of fulfilment. Three of the pledges were made by the 
Conservatives and four by the Liberal Democrats (one was made by both parties). The 
selected pledges vary with respect to fulfilment: two were not fulfilled and four were 
at least partially fulfilled (two of which fully and two partially fulfilled). The six 
pledges were chosen to cover policy areas that respondents report as the most 
important: economy, health, education, immigration, domestic security and pensions.
3
  
The first two pledges were unfulfilled. The first pledge is the Liberal 
Democrats’ promise to “scrap tuition fees” in higher education. As part of the 
coalition agreement, the party dropped this manifesto promise and instead agreed with 
the Conservatives to treble tuition fees to £9,000 per annum, which resulted in 
widespread student demonstrations. Given the large amount of media attention given 
to this unfulfilled pledge, including a public apology by the Liberal Democrats for 
                                                        
3
 Details of the primary sources consulted (the election platforms and relevant 
government actions) are reported in the Online Appendix. Our own assessment of the 
fulfillment of these pledges follows the procedure of an established research group 
that has assessed the reliability of coders’ assessments of pledge fulfillment 
comparattively (see Thomson et al., 2017). We conducted a robustness test in which 
we excluded the two pledges we code as partially fulfilled, since we acknowledge that 
there is more room for interpretation in these cases than the other four pledges. The 
test is reported in the Online Appendix and shows that our main findings hold wihtout 
these partially fulfilled pledges. 
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breaking it, we expect the overwhelming majority of people to identify this pledge as 
unfulfilled.  
Second, we include the Conservatives unfulfilled pledge to “take steps to take 
net migration back to the levels of the 1990s – tens of thousands a year, not hundreds 
of thousands”. There was no systematic decline in net migration since 2010, but rather 
an increase over the course of the subsequent governing period as a whole. Net 
migration first declined from over 200,000 in 2010 to 150,000 in the middle of 2012, 
and then rose again to over 300,000 in 2014. A considerable amount of media 
attention was given to this issue and the Conservative Party’s promise on it. 
The third pledge is the fully fulfilled promise made separately by both parties 
in their 2010 manifestos, to “scrap ID cards and the next generation of biometric 
passports”. The introduction of ID cards was set out by the previous Labour 
administration in the Identity Cards Act 2006 but not carried out before 2010, and 
both Conservatives and Liberal Democrats pledged to scrap the plan entirely when in 
office. They included this pledge in the coalition agreement and the Identity Card Act 
2006 was indeed repealed in 2010. Fourth, the Liberal Democrats pledged to “scrap 
compulsory retirement ages, allowing those who wish to continue in work to do so”. 
This election pledge was fulfilled, as default retirement ages were phased out by the 
end of September 2011. 
The fifth pledge is the Conservatives’ pledge “to increase health spending in 
real terms every year”, which we code as partially fulfilled. Given the severe cuts to 
other departments, we consider the ring-fencing of Health spending and real increases 
in some years as a partial fulfilment of the pledge. Nonetheless, there is some room 
for debate on this pledge. In 2012 the Chair of the UK Statistics Authority wrote to 
the Health Secretary stating that a real-terms increase had not been achieved in 2011-
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12, and indeed that expenditure in 2011-12 had been lower than 2009-10, but that 
“given the small size of the changes and the uncertainties associated with them, it 
might also be fair to say that real terms expenditure had changed little over this 
period”. Sixth and finally, we selected the Liberal Democrats’ promise to raise the 
tax-free personal allowance to £10,000 for the start of the financial year 2011-2012. 
This is a partially fulfilled promise, because it took two years longer than stated to 
raise the tax-free allowance to the promised level. It was raised to £10,000 by the 
beginning of the new tax year in 2014. 
The British Election Study includes a survey experiment embedded in a split-
sample design to elicit respondents’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment. Half of the 
respondents received questions that referred to “parties” and “promises”, while the 
other half received questions that referred to “proposals”. As explained above, the 
different question wordings are intended to raise and lower the salience of distrust as 
a heuristic when respondents give their evaluations. Since we only test for one 
specific frame, we avoid the trap of many survey experiments that lack a control 
group (see Gaines, Kuklinski and Quirk, 2006). 
The “party-promise” questions in the survey experiment, which were put to just 
over 2,600 randomly selected respondents, read: 
Before the 2010 General Election, the following promises were made by one or 
both of the parties that afterwards formed the government. For each of these, do 
you think the promise was fully kept, partially kept, or not kept at all? 
1) A promise to increase health spending in real terms every year 
2) A promise to scrap ID cards and the next generation of biometric passports 
3) A promise to reduce net migration to less than 100,000 per year. 
4) A promise to scrap compulsory retirement ages 
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5) A promise to raise the tax-free personal allowance to £10,000 for the start of the 
financial year 2011-2012 
6) A promise to scrap University tuition fees 
The “proposal” questions, which were also asked of just over 2,600 respondents, read: 
The following policy proposals were made in 2010. For each of these, do you 
think the proposal was fully, partially or not adopted at all? 
1) A proposal to increase health spending in real terms every year 
2) A proposal to scrap ID cards and the next generation of biometric passports 
3) A proposal to reduce net migration to less than 100,000 per year. 
4) A proposal to scrap compulsory retirement ages 
5) A proposal to raise the tax-free personal allowance to £10,000 for the start of the 
financial year 2011-2012 
6) A proposal to scrap University tuition fees 
Each of the party promise-versions of the questions was answered by at least 
1,892 respondents (excluding “don’t know” answers). Each of the proposal-versions 
of questions was answered by at least 1,943 respondents. In total, we have 24,785 
responses from 4,825 respondents with evaluations of pledge fulfilment. This reduces 
to 16,448 responses from 3,175 respondents if we exclude cases for which we miss 
information on one or more of our preferred measures of our explanatory or control 
variables. Most of our analyses are performed on this “stacked” dataset of 16,448 
observations. This is the most appropriate design, given that we are interested in the 
effect of variation in actual pledge fulfilment on respondents’ evaluations, which 
varies at the level of the respondent-item dyad. We apply sample weights in all of our 
models to ensure that the sample is representative of the population. 
We measure respondents’ political knowledge with a set of twelve knowledge 
questions. Respondents were first asked to identify their local MP, with randomized 
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false candidate names offered together with the correct one. In other questions, 
respondents were asked to match UK politicians and leaders of other countries to their 
correct political offices. Given that these knowledge questions were spread across 
waves 1-5, not all respondents received all twelve questions (although 90 percent 
did). We constructed a standardised 0-10 knowledge scale ranging from 0 (no correct 
answers) to 10 (all correct answers), regardless of the number of knowledge questions 
received. “Don’t know” answers are counted the same as incorrect answers. 
To measure trust defined in terms of distrust and heuristic thinking we use a 
variable to which the BES refers as “government trust”. Recall that our conceptual 
definition of trust in relation to Lenard’s (2008) use of the term distrust is that it is a 
general expectation on the part of a citizen that the party will meet his or her positive 
expectations when governing. The relevant BES item asks: “How much would you 
expect each of the following political parties to do a good job or a bad job if they are 
in government after the General Election (either by themselves or as part of a 
coalition)?”
4
 For each political party, respondents are asked to give a number from 1 
(for “would do a bad job”) to 7 (for “would do a good job”). For the pledges made by 
the Liberal Democrats, we match respondents’ trust in the Liberal Democrats, and 
likewise for the Conservatives. For the pledge made by both parties we take the 
                                                        
4
 Scholars of public opinion in the US commonly use the “do what is right” question 
in the US National Election Study to measure trust, by which respondents are asked 
how much of the time they thought they could trust the government in Washington to 
do what is right (e.g. Rudolph and Popp, 2009, p. 339). The BES does not contain a 
comparable instrument, but our measure is more in line with our concept of trust, 
which focuses on trust in governing parties, rather than government as a whole. 
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maximum values. We rescaled the values to range from 0-6, which facilitates the 
interpretation of the interaction terms. 
The control variable for party identification uses respondents’ answers to the 
question, “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any political party? [If so] 
Which party is that?” Responses to this question determined whether respondents 
were coded as identifying with a governing party or an opposition party. This 
operationalization is in line with Miller’s (1991) view of party identification as a 
categorical rather than a continuous variable. It is also in line with previous 
operationalizations of party identification in the UK (Marsh and Tilley, 2010).  
 The demographic control variables consist of age, gender, education and 
occupation. For education, we distinguish between those with and without college 
education. The variable for occupation is based on the categories defined in the 
British Election Study, and distinguishes between higher (including professional and 
supervisory roles), intermediate and lower (including routine jobs) occupations.  
 In addition to our preferred model, which we present in the following section, 
we ran a series of robustness tests, which we also discuss at the end of the Analysis 
section and present in the Online Appendix. These robustness tests confirm the main 
findings from the model. They include a test using an alternative operationalisation of 
trust that approximates Hardin’s (2002) conception of trust as encapsulated interest. 
They also include models that examine the answers to each pledge question 
separately, which are relevant given the differences between the pledges in, among 
other things, the amount of media attention they received. We run a model excluding 
the pledges we code as partially fulfilled, since there is arguably more ambiguity in 
these cases. We also present a model without the control variables. None of these 
robustness tests give substantially different results to those we now present. 
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Analysis 
 
The distributions of respondents’ answers to the twelve items about parties’ election 
pledges suggests two noteworthy points (Figure 1). First, citizens’ evaluations broadly 
reflect actual performance (Hypothesis 1a). This is true regardless of whether the 
pledges are presented as parties’ promises or simply as proposals. We find that the 
overwhelming majority of respondents (80 percent) correctly identified the pledge on 
tuition fees as not fulfilled when they were asked if this promise was kept. This is 
unsurprising given the prominence of this broken promise in the media. Likewise, 61 
percent of respondents correctly answered that the promise to reduce yearly 
immigration to under 100,000 was not kept. By contrast, people were more likely to 
say that pledges were at least partially fulfilled if they were in fact at least partially 
fulfilled. Majorities of respondents (54 and 60 percent) said that the promises to scrap 
compulsory retirement ages and ID cards were at least partially fulfilled. We coded 
these two pledges are fully fulfilled. For the pledge to raise the tax-free allowance, 
which we coded as partially fulfilled, the majority of respondents (54 percent) thought 
the pledge was either partially or fully fulfilled. Despite the obvious association 
between respondents’ evaluations and actual performance, people give negative 
evaluations more readily than positive ones. For the pledge on health spending, which 
we coded as partially fulfilled, “not fulfilled” was the most common response 
category from the public, regardless of the question wording.  
<Figure 1> 
The second noteworthy point from Figure 1 is that people appear more 
inclined to say that pledges were fulfilled in response to questions that refer to the 
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adoption of proposals than the fulfilment of parties’ pledges (Hypothesis 2a). This is 
the case for five of the six pledge topics. For instance, regarding the partially fulfilled 
pledge to increase health spending each year, 48 percent of people who were asked 
the party-promise version of the question said it was not fulfilled, compared to 38 
percent of those who were asked the proposal version. The pledge to scrap ID cards 
and biometric passports is a partial exception to this pattern, since the evaluations in 
response to the party-promise question appear to be more positive than those in 
response to the proposal question. It is possible that the two components of the pledge 
– “ID cards” and “biometric passports” – had some distorting effect on the responses 
in this case. While a considerable amount of attention was given to the issue of ID 
cards in the media, less attention was given to biometric passports. 
We now turn to the multiple regression analysis. The data are stacked, so that 
each row refers to a single respondent in relation to one of the twelve pledge items in 
the survey. Each respondent appears in the dataset a maximum of six times if they 
answered all six of the promise or proposal questions. This gives 16,448 observations 
after accounting for missing values on our variables of interest. The dependent 
variable in the main analysis presented here is coded 0 for respondents who answered 
that the promise was not fulfilled or the proposal not adopted and 1 for respondents 
who answered that the promise was partially or fully fulfilled or that the proposal was 
partially or fully adopted. We exclude “don’t know” answers. We analyse this 
dichotomous dependent variable with a logit model, in which the standard errors are 
clustered by respondent. We prefer the dichotomous dependent variable since some of 
the answer categories are sparsely populated, particularly the “Fully fulfilled” 
category in response to pledges that were not fulfilled. These robustness tests (see 
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Online Appendix) include a multinomial model in which we use the three-category 
indicator of evaluations, which gives the same results. 
The model in Table 1 indicates that people are more likely to say that a pledge 
was fulfilled it is was in fact fulfilled (Hypothesis 1a). This is true even for people 
who know very little about politics. However, the evaluations of more knowledgeable 
respondents are significantly more accurate – i.e. are more strongly affected by actual 
fulfilment - than are the evaluations of less knowledgeable citizens (Hypothesis 1b). 
The first three coefficients in Table 1 are relevant here: those associated with the 
variables Actual fulfilment, Knowledge, and the interaction between the two. The 
coefficient associated with Actual fulfilment is positive (1.86) and significant (p<.00), 
which indicates that Actual fulfilment has a positive effect on citizens’ evaluations 
when Knowledge has a value of zero. So even respondents who gave incorrect 
answers to all of the knowledge questions are significantly more likely to give 
positive evaluations for pledges that were at least partially fulfilled. The exponent of 
the coefficient, 6.41, is the odds ratio and indicates that this is a large effect. The odds 
of people with a knowledge score of zero giving a positive evaluation are 6.41 times 
greater for pledges that were at least partially fulfilled than for pledges that were not 
fulfilled. 
<Table 1> 
The level of political knowledge held by respondents strengthens the impact of 
actual performance on their evaluations. The direct effect of Knowledge is negative 
and significant, which indicates that for pledges that were in fact unfulfilled, the more 
knowledgeable are less likely to say that those pledges were fulfilled. The exponent of 
the coefficient, .88, indicates that for every one-point increase in respondents’ 
knowledge score (on the 0-10 scale), the odds that they give an “incorrect” positive 
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evaluation of an unfulfilled pledge decreases by 12 percent. The significant 
interaction between the variables Actual fulfilment and Knowledge indicates that the 
more knowledgeable are more likely to give positive evaluations of fulfilled pledges 
than are the less knowledgeable. Respondents’ knowledge has a positive effect on 
their evaluations of fulfilled pledges; combining the main and interaction effects of 
the variable Knowledge gives a coefficient estimate of .07 (=-.12+.19), which is 
significant (s.e. .02, p=.00). The exponent of .07, which is 1.07, indicates that every 
one-point increase in respondents’ knowledge score is associated with a 7 percent 
increase in the odds that they give a “correct” positive evaluation of a pledge that was 
in fact fulfilled at least partially. 
Figure 2 depicts the effects of the variables Actual fulfilment and Knowledge 
as predicted probabilities, holding other variables of interest constant at their means 
(for scale variables) or modes (for categorical variables). The downward sloping lines 
at the bottom of the figure give the probabilities (and relevant confidence intervals) 
that respondents with different levels of knowledge offer positive evaluations of 
unfulfilled pledges. As the variable Knowledge increases from its minimum value of 
0 to its maximum value of 10, the probability that a respondent gives an incorrect 
positive evaluation of an unfulfilled pledge decreases from .16 (95% confidence 
interval (CI): .08, .24) to .06 (95% CI: .04, .06). The ascending line indicates that as 
Knowledge increases from its minimum to its maximum, the probability that a 
respondent gives a correct positive evaluation of a fulfilled pledge increases from .55 
(95% CI .46, .64) to .71 (95% CI .67, .75). The fact that these two sets of confidence 
intervals do not overlap, even for citizens with low levels of knowledge, reinforces 
the point that actual performance has a large effect on citizens’ evaluations, even for 
those with low levels of political knowledge. 
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<Figure 2> 
The next three coefficients refer to our experimental treatment variable and 
respondents’ trust in politicians. People are significantly more likely to say that 
pledges were fulfilled in response to the proposal wordings of the questions 
(Hypothesis 2a). Moreover, trust has a marked positive effect on people’s evaluations 
(Hypothesis 2b), particularly when they are presented with questions about parties’ 
promises (Hypothesis 2c). The coefficient associated with the variable Proposal 
treatment refers to the effect of the proposal treatment compared to the party-promise 
treatment on respondents with the lowest level of trust in governing parties. The odds 
of these respondents giving a positive evaluation are 98 percent greater (p=.00) when 
they are presented with the proposal version of the question than the party-promise 
version of the question.  
Respondents’ trust, which is defined in terms of distrust and heuristic thinking, 
affects their evaluations positively, particularly when they are presented with 
questions that refer to parties’ promises. The coefficient associated with the variable 
Trust is positive and significant. The coefficient is .24, of which the exponent is 1.27, 
and this indicates that every one-unit increase in respondents’ trust on the 0-6 scale 
increases the odds that they give a positive evaluation by 27 percent. The significant 
negative coefficient of -.12 associated with the interaction between the variables Trust 
and Proposal treatment indicates that the effect of trust is significantly lower when 
respondents are presented with the proposal versions of the questions than the party-
promise versions. However, the net effect of trust is still positive at .12 (=.24+(-.12)) 
and significant (s.e. .02; p=.00). So the effect of trust on people’s evaluations, while 
still positive and significant, is much weaker when the proposal treatment is given 
compared to the party-promise treatment. The significant negative interaction effect 
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also indicates that the proposal treatment has a weaker effect on more trusting people. 
For respondents with relatively high levels of trust (or low levels of distrust), the 
proposal treatment has no effect.  
The effects of the variables Proposal treatment and Trust are depicted as 
predicted probabilities in Figure 3. Like the predicted probabilities in Figure 2, these 
hold other variables constant at their means or modes. Since four of our six pledges 
were at least partially fulfilled, these probabilities refer to respondents’ evaluations of 
pledges that were at least partially fulfilled. The unbroken line that ascends most 
steeply from left to right gives the predicted probabilities that respondents with 
different levels of trust offer positive evaluations in response to the party-promise 
questions. As trust increases from its minimum to its maximum values, the probability 
of a positive evaluation increases from .54 (95% CI .49, .59) to .83 (95%CI .80, .86). 
The flatter line refers to the effect of trust on the probability of a positive evaluation 
in response to the proposal versions of the questions. The effect is weaker, as the 
predicted probability increases from .70 (95% CI .66, .74) to .82 (95% CI .79, .86). 
The fact that the confidence intervals overlap at medium and high levels of trust 
indicates that the proposal treatment has no effect on respondents with medium and 
high levels of trust in politicians. For respondents with a score of 3 or higher on the 
variable Trust, the confidence intervals overlap. The bars, which show the distribution 
of observations, clearly show that many respondents have low levels of trust. In total 
50 percent of the observations have values of 0 to 2 on the 0-6 scale, at which points 
there are significant differences between respondents who receive the party-promise 
and proposal treatments.  
<Figure 3> 
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 Of the control variables, Party identification is worth mentioning. Regardless 
of whether a pledge is actually fulfilled, people who identify with one of the 
governing parties are more likely to say that pledges were fulfilled than people who 
do not identify with a party. However, people who identify with an opposition party 
are not less likely to give positive evaluations than people who do not identify with a 
party. It could be that the non-identifiers tend to be more disengaged from politics 
than identifiers and that this disengagement is associated with more negative 
evaluations.  
 We conducted a series of tests to check the robustness of the results, which are 
detailed in the Online Appendix. Among these, we ran an additional analysis with an 
alternative measure of trust as encapsulated interest, according to which “I trust you 
because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter 
seriously … you encapsulate my interests in your own interests” (Harding 2002, 1). 
Although based on a distinct definition and measure of trust, the results are very 
similar. We also ran a model that explored whether there is an interaction between 
trust and knowledge, which there is not. We ran a multinomial model with a three-
category dependent variable, which gave substantively the same results. Other 
robustness tests involved separate analyses of subsets of the data: a model that 
excluded the partially fulfilled pledges and models that examined each topic 
separately. We ran separate analyses of each topic with an additional variable to 
identify respondents who were personally affected by each pledge. We also ran a 
model without the control variables. The findings of these robustness tests are 
consistent with those presented here, although as would be expected not all 
coefficients are statistically significant when we limit the analyses to relatively small 
subsets of the data. Our key findings are therefore robust to different coding of 
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citizens’ evaluations and actual fulfilment, are not driven by the particular topics of 
the pledges we examine, and are robust to different model specifications. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence shows that British citizens are able to give accurate evaluations of 
policy performance in terms of governing parties’ fulfilment of specific pledges that 
were made in previous election campaigns. The capacity to form evaluations based on 
performance is part of the healthy vigilance that Lenard (2008) identifies in 
mistrustful, critical citizens, who control their governments effectively. In line with 
our expectations, the evidence shows that knowledge improves the accuracy of 
citizens’ evaluations. However, the level of knowledge required to make accurate 
evaluations of pledge fulfilment is well within most people’s grasp, and does not 
require unrealistic demands of their cognitive capacities or interest in politics.  
This key finding, together with a growing body of evidence from related 
research, points to the relevance of promissory representation in the practice of 
democratic politics. Promissory representation holds that candidates make promises to 
voters during election campaigns and seek to keep those promises if they 
subsequently enter office (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 515). Existing research focuses 
mainly on the extent to which parties they keep their election pledges, and generally 
finds high rates of pledge fulfilment depending on institutional constraints and 
economic conditions (Pomper and Lederman, 1980; Rallings, 1987; Royed, 1996; 
Thomson et al., 2017). Little attention has been given to citizens’ evaluations of 
promise keeping and breaking by governing parties, despite the fact that a responsible 
electorate, which rewards and punishes parties for variation in performance is an 
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essential counterpart to responsible parties (VO Key, 1966). Our key finding that 
citizens’ evaluations of promise keeping reflect actual performance in terms of 
promise keeping contrasts with their answers to general questions about the extent to 
which politicians keep their promises, which are generally overwhelmingly negative 
(e.g. ISSP, 2008). Our finding is, however, in line with the two previous studies that 
examined this topic, which focused on citizens’ evaluations of pledge fulfilment in 
Ireland (Thomson 2011) and Sweden (Naurin and Oscarsson, 2017, p.9). This 
research indicates that people hold far more nuanced and accurate views on promise 
keeping and breaking than suggested by their responses to general questions. The 
discrepancy between citizens’ responses to general questions about promise keeping 
and the results of pledge research by academics may be due to different definitions of 
pledges. Citizens’ may adhere at least implicitly to broader definitions of campaign 
promises than those used in research on pledge fulfilment (see also Naurin 2011). 
This is part of the explanation of the puzzle of the discrepancy between findings from 
research on pledge fulfilment and citizens’ responses to general questions about 
promise breaking by politicians. 
Another part of the explanation of the puzzle is that citizens’ evaluations are 
influenced not only by actual policy performance, in terms of whether promises were 
actually kept, but also individual characteristics, some of which lead them to make 
negative evaluations of promise keeping, even for promises that were kept. This 
conclusion resonates with research on citizens’ evaluations of governments’ general 
performance on the economy and other broad policy areas (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and 
Elias, 2008; Duch, Palmer and Anderson, 2000; Evans and Andersen, 2006; Marsh 
and Tilley, 2010). Like Kramer (1983) and Duch, Palmer and Anderson (2000), our 
explanation of evaluations of pledge fulfilment combines actual performance with 
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individual-level characteristics. Our study shows that this explanatory approach can 
be extended beyond evaluations of policy performance to evaluations of promise 
keeping. 
Of these individual characteristics, we focused on trust as a heuristic, which 
Lenard (2008) defines as distrust or cynicism and the expectation of betrayal. When 
defined in these terms, trust is a heuristic for making evaluations in the context of 
incomplete information and ambiguity (Hetherington, 2004; Rudolph and Evans, 
2005). We argued that the evaluations of untrusting citizens are more negative 
because they are informed by the stereotype of promise-breaking politicians. Our 
survey experiment found evidence for this mechanism by changing the salience of 
trust as relevant heuristic for respondents when they gave their assessments. 
Respondents with low to average levels of trust in parties, and who were primed to 
think about parties’ promises when they answered, were more likely to say that 
pledges were unfulfilled. Their answers were significantly more negative than similar 
respondents who were not primed to think about parties’ promises when they 
answered. This significant difference indicates that respondents’ evaluations of pledge 
fulfilment are affected by their pre-existing levels of trust or distrust, independently of 
whether or not the pledges were actually fulfilled.  
The effect of distrust, which appears to shape citizens’ evaluations of 
performance irrespective of actual performance, is of great concern. Many scholars 
see trust as a necessary component of the political culture that supports healthy 
democratic systems and lament declining levels of trust in recent decades (e.g. 
Diamond, 1998, p. 208). An alternative view is that “in perhaps a strange and 
counterintuitive way, representative democracy and distrust go together in political 
theory” (Hardin, 2002, p. 107; see also Hart, 1978). While we recognise the 
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importance of mistrust as healthy vigilance with respect to representative democracy, 
we see no benefit of distrust as endemic cynicism. We found it useful to distinguish 
between the normatively positive and negative aspects of trust and recommend this 
approach to other researchers. We also look forward to future research on the 
relations between these different aspects of trust as well as their causes and 
consequences. For instance, while mistrustful citizens are able to detect broken and 
kept promises, research is yet to identify the conditions under which they punish and 
reward governing parties for their performance in this respect. 
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Figures and tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Citizens’ evaluations of the fulfilment of six pledges 
Source: British Election Study 2014-17. Note: “Promise” refers respondents’ answers to 
question about the “fulfilment of parties’ promises”, while “Proposal” refers to 
respondents’ answers to questions about the “adoption of proposals”.  
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Figure 2. The effects of pledge fulfilment and knowledge on citizens’ evaluations 
Note: Unbroken lines are point estimates of the probability that a respondent 
evaluates a pledge as partially or fully fulfilled; broken lines are 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Fully or partially 
fulfilled pledge 
Unfulfilled pledge 
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Figure 3. The effect of trust as a heuristic on citizens’ evaluations 
Note: Probability of a positive evaluation (i.e. evaluating a pledge as partially or fully 
fulfilled) of a pledge that was in fact at least partially fulfilled. Unbroken lines are 
point estimates; broken lines are 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
“Proposal” 
treatment 
“Party promise” 
treatment 
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Table 1. Model of the causes of citizens’ evaluations of promise keeping 
 Exp(b) b (s.e.) p 
Trust defined as mistrust and healthy vigilance:  
Actual performance and political knowledge 
   
Actual fulfilment (0=not; 1=partially/fully) 6.41 1.86 (.24) .00 
Knowledge .89 -.12 (.03) .00 
Actual fulfilment  × Knowledge 
 
1.20 .19 (.03) .00 
Trust defined as distrust and heuristic thinking:  
Question wording and self-reported trust in 
governing parties 
   
Proposal treatment (0=party promise; 
1=proposal treatment) 
 
1.98 
 
.68 (.10) 
 
.00 
Trust 1.27 .24 (.02) .00 
Proposal treatment × Trust 
 
.88 -.12 (.03) .00 
Control variables    
Party identification 
(reference category=no party identification) 
 
 
  
   Governing party identifiers 1.60 .47 (.08) .00 
   Opposition party identifiers 1.00 .00 (.08) .96 
Occupation .99 -.01 (.05) .76 
Age  1.00 .00 (.00) .77 
Gender (0=male;1=female) .83 -.18 (.07) .01 
Education (0=lower than college; 1=college or 
higher) 
1.08 .07 (.06) .24 
Topics (reference category= 
tuition fees and ID cards) 
   
   Immigration numbers 4.67 1.54 (.10) .00 
   Health spending .30 -1.19 (.08) .00 
   Tax-free allowance 1.23 .21 (.08) .01 
   Compulsory retirement ages 1.21 .19 (.08) .02 
Constant .09 -2.38 (.32) .00 
Log pseudolikelihood -9996.70   
Wald χ
2
 (p) 2164.95   .00 
n observations 16,448   
n respondents (clusters) 3,175   
Note: Logit model. Robust standard errors clustered by respondent. Dependent 
variable: whether respondents evaluate the pledge as “not” fulfilled (0) or “partially” 
or “fully” fulfilled (1). Adjusted for sample weights.  
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